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Money, cycles and capital formation:
von Mises the ‘Austrian’ vs. Robertson
the ‘Dynamist’
Lilia Costabile*
A ‘disequilibrium’ between saving and investment decisions determines
a maladjustment in production, the disruption of capital, and a downturn in
economic activity, according to the ‘Austrian’ approach. By contrast, the
‘Dynamists’ argue that it may lead to economic growth, as disequilibrium may
well be instrumental to capital accumulation. What explains these different
predictions in otherwise similar models? The key is in the interplay between
the analytical features and the ideological options underlying each of these
approaches: alternative lines of thought, entirely compatible with their
analytical models, were abandoned by some of these authors when they
conflicted with their pre-analytical views. This paper illustrates the argument
by exploring the models of two ‘fathers’, von Mises and Robertson.
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1. Introduction
Dynamic equilibrium requires equality between the fraction of real income that is not
used for consumption purposes and the fraction that is used as capital in production.
With a costant capital:output ratio, this requirement is equivalent to stating that the
output’s rate of growth must be equal to the ratio between the propensity to save and
the capital:output ratio, as in the ‘Domar equation’.
What happens when, starting from an equilibrium situation, investment decisions
rise, while no matching saving decision occurs? In one class of models, a maladjust-
ment in production, the disruption of capital, and a downturn in economic activity
necessarily follow. According to a different approach, investment may lead to capital
accumulation, as growth may well occur out of equilibrium.
The first approach is that taken by the ‘Austrians’ who, in spite of the label, are not
a geographical sub-grouping, but the exponents of an internationally spread branch of
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liberalism, who apply their liberal views to the explanation of the role of money in
economic dynamics: von Mises, Hayek and, to some extent, Friedman and Lucas
belong in this line of thought. The second approach is taken by those whom
(apologizing for the neologism) I refer to as the ‘Dynamists’, who do not regard
growth as either determined or constrained by the volume of available savings, argue
that monetary factors can permanently affect the time-profile of economic variables,
and consider cyclical movements as an essential component of the process of growth.
Schumpeter, Robertson and, later, some post-Keynesian authors (mainly Domar,
Harrod and Kaldor) belong to this tradition. Keynes expressed similar ideas in his
Treatise on Money.
What explains the different predictions of these alternative models? I put forward
the idea that the theory of money, cycles and growth is one of the main battlefields
where the ideological battle over the nature of market economies has been fought.1 To
be provocative and extreme: this theory can be interpreted, and will be interpreted in
this paper, as a technically refined branch of political philosophy. While a general
‘proof’ of these propositions would require a more encompassing analysis,2 here I
propose to offer an illustration, by concentrating on the models of two theoretical
‘fathers’: von Mises (Mises for simplicity), the father of the ‘Austrian’ approach, and
Robertson, an early, leading exponent of the ‘Dynamic’ approach. Passing reference,
when appropriate, will be made to the relations between them and some of their
theoretical descendants.
Sections 2–5 illustrate the interplay between the analytical features and the
ideological options underlying Mises’s business cycles model. The following main
points emerge. First, Mises’s work on money and cycles was, and was conceived to be
by himself, part of a conservative version of liberal political philosophy. Secondly, as
a telling example from his The Theory of Money and Credit shows, he came very close to
demonstrating that monetary expansions may lead to capital formation rather than
a ‘maladjustment’ in resource allocation, but systematically refused to pursue this
idea. Interpreting his reluctance to recognise the implications of his own insights, I
suggest that his philosophical commitment shaped the features of his model, and
influenced the direction of his research, to the point that alternative lines of thought,
entirely compatible with his analytical model, were abandoned when they conflicted
with this pre-analytical view.
The second part of this paper (Sections 6–8) explores the basic ideas animating the
‘Dynamists’ approach and their ‘non-Austrian’ political liberalism, through an
analysis of Robertson’s views on money and growth. ‘Ideological testing’ is imposed
upon Robertson’s vision as well. Finally, a very simple model illustrating his views is
presented, in order to support his (and other Dynamists’) idea that growth can occur
via a disequilibrium process.
A Conclusion draws the argument together.
1 A long-standing tradition confirms this point of view: among many others, see Keynes, (1934
[1973], pp. 485–92), and Ellis, in his Preface to Haberler (1944).
2 This analysis should: (i) explore the models of other ‘liberal’ authors, but also deal with political
philosophies outside liberalism; (ii) analyse other causes of cyclical movements (such as changes in
effective demand, shifts in entrepreneurial expectations, etc.); and (iii) distinguish between ‘endogen-
ous’ and ‘exogenous’ theories. Costabile (1998) explores some of these issues.
2 of 23 L. Costabile
2. The ‘Austrians’: ideological roots
In the ‘Austrian’ approach I include some Austrian and American writers who are
characterised by their unlimited devotion to the flag of free-market economies, and by
having planted this flag on the theoretical territory of money, cycles and capital
formation. New light is shed on the analytical features of the ‘Austrian’ approach by an
understanding of their ideological roots in Mises’s early work.
These writers hold to the view that ‘the chief blemish’ of the market order, namely
its ‘susceptibility to recurrent periods of depression and unemployment’ (Hayek,
1978, p. 14) is in fact to be imputed to an external interference with the market order
itself. This interference is not the product of natural causes; rather, it is due to an
‘arbitrary influence—a political influence; i.e., one arising from the conscious inter-
vention of human organisations’, namely the State and its expression: governments
(Mises, (1924 [1971]), p. 226).1
The channel of this arbitrary influence is monetary policy. The link between money
and cycles is thus established: money is the cause of cyclical instability, not of capital
accumulation, because it is the instrument of governments’ political power. The root
of the evil is ‘the subjection of the value of money to the influence of political forces’
(ibid., p.396).2
This central message finds its roots, as Mises argued, in the liberal notion that the
market economy is not only the best, but also the only possible system of organisation
of society, because it ensures that consumers’ sovereignty is respected. On the one
hand, the private property of the means of production shifts the ownership and control
of resources into the hands of those who are best fitted to control production. On the
other hand, through the market process, consumers signal their needs to entrepre-
neurs and capitalists, who are nothing but the passive executors of consumers’ orders.
States and governments are necessary to preserve the working of the market
economy, but they may turn into despots, and ‘turn their weapons against those whom
they were expected to serve’ (Mises, 1952 [1971] , p. 413). Monetary policy is one of
the weapons which states may turn against their citizens, thus distorting the free
working of the market. The principle of sound money is part of the liberal defence of
the individual’s freedom against the interference of despotic governments: ‘It is
impossible to grasp the meaning of the idea of sound money if one does not realise that
it was devised as an instrument for the protection of civil liberties against the despotic
inroads on the part of governments. Ideologically it belongs in the same class with
political constitutions and bills of rights’ (ibid., p. 414).
1 All quotations from Mises‘s The Theory of Money and Credit refer to the 1971 reprint of the first
American edition, which was published in 1952. The first three parts of this book reproduce the first
English edition, published in 1934 by the London School of Economics, with an Introduction by Lionel
Robbins; the Fourth Part was added in 1952. The 1934 English edition, in turn, was based on the text of
the second German edition, published in 1924 (with minor omissions, according to Lionel Robbins’s
1934 Introduction). The first German edition had been published in 1912. Summing up, some of our
quotations go back to what von Mises argued in 1924 (i.e., those contained in the first three parts of his
book), while those included in the Fourth Part were originally written in 1952. In the text, I will refer to
Mises (1924 [1971]), and (1952 [1971]), respectively.
2 Mises accordingly regretted that the ‘pure’ gold standard had been abandoned (Mises, 1944 [1995],
p. 45); opposed the role of central banks as lenders of last resort (ibid., p. 86); advocated free banking,
lamenting that ‘private banks and joint stock banks were supplanted by politically privileged banks of
issue, because the governments favoured the expansion of circulation credit for reasons of fiscal and
credit policy’ (ibid., p. 88).
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In this version of liberalism, there is no role for state intervention in the economy;
there are no ‘market failures’ to remedy. The state should act as the ‘minimal state’,
providing defence and police services. Its intervention is a violation of consumer
sovereignty, an offence to individual liberties. This is the basic reason why it cannot be
but ineffective and disruptive in its economic consequences. The ‘Austrian’ approach
to money and business cycles is nothing but a set of variations on this basic theme.
3. Mises’s two-fold attack on monetary policy
3.1 Inflation and the public’s deception
This basic idea concerning the negative consequences of monetary ‘interferences’
leads to the statement that the essence of monetary policies is the intentional
deception of the public. These policies are effective only in so far as, by messing up the
price mechanism, they succeed in deceiving private agents: inflationism is ‘a policy
concerning whose aims and intentions public opinion can be longest deceived. Its
popularity, in fact, is rooted in the difficulty of fully understanding its consequences’
(Mises, 1924 [1971], p. 231).
These consequences are of two different types, and their analysis is the basis for
Mises’s two-fold attack on monetary policy, to be illustrated in this sub-section and the
next.
Anticipating modern theoretical developments, Mises attacked monetary policies
through an analysis of: (i) changes in relative prices and in the general price level
occurring in the course of the inflationary process; (ii) the supply side effects of these
changes; and (iii) the ultimate ineffectiveness of monetary policies.
As for point (i), he argued that the policy-induced distortions of price signals lead
individual agents to confuse what are, in fact, changes in the general price level for
changes in relative prices, i.e., basically, for changes in their compensations. The
distortion of price signals may trigger spurious quantity adjustments, i.e., adjustments
that would not occur in the absence of the government’s inflationary policies.
This idea developed into Hayek’s models of the business cycle in the 1930s, and
then into Friedman’s and Lucas’s related notion that a noisy (as we would call it
to-day) monetary policy confuses price signals, thus leading to unwarranted supply
adjustments. This happens because uncertainty about the inflation rate generates an
‘extraction problem’, i.e., the problem of distinguishing between the two sources of
price disturbance: monetary factors, which affect the general price level, and the
relative price effect. Mises’s early, clear statement of the ‘extraction problem’ is worth
reproducing at length, with the proviso that its understandable, pre-rational expect-
ations emphasis on the public’s ‘dullness’ makes his analysis more germane to those
proposed by Hayek and Friedman than to Lucas’s.
In normal times, that is in periods in which the government does not tamper with the
monetary standard, people do not bother about monetary problems. Quite naively they take it
for granted that the monetary unit’s purchasing power is ‘stable’. They pay attention to the
changes occurring in the money prices of commodities. They know very well that the
exchange-ratios between different commodities vary. But they are not conscious of the fact
that the exchange-ratio between money on the one side and all commodities and services on
the other side is variable too. When the inevitable consequences of inflation appear and prices
soar, they think that commodities are becoming dearer and fail to see that money is getting
cheaper. In the early stages of inflation only few people discern what is going on, manage their
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business affairs in accordance with this insight, and deliberately aim at reaping inflation gains.
The overwhelming majority are too dull to grasp a correct interpretation of the situation. They
go on in the routine they acquired in non-inflationary periods (. . .) This ignorance of the
public is the indispensable basis for inflationary policy. (Mises, 1952 [1971], pp. 418–9).
With regard to point (ii) above, Mises clearly understood the ‘supply side’ effects of
policy-induced distortions in price-signals, as the following passage clarifies:
‘In such circumstances [i.e., in the transition from price stability to inflation], the seller is
deprived of his sole reliable check over the reasonableness of the prices he demands. He sees
that these prices are paid, thinks that the profits of his business are increasing proportion-
ately, and only gradually discovers that the fall in the purchasing power of money deprives
him of part of the advantage he has gained[. . .] It cannot be denied that much of this
passing-on of price-increases has indeed reduced the value of money, but has by no means
altered the exchange-ratios between other economic goods in the intended degree.’ (Mises,
1924 [1971], p. 164)1
It is also worthwhile stressing that Mises (as shown by his focusing on the transition
from ‘normal times’ to times when the government starts to ‘tamper with the
monetary standard’) seems to be aware that what generates confusion is not inflation
per se, but uncertainty concerning the rate of price changes, or, in Lucas’s terms,
changes in the ‘degree of price variability’ (Lucas, 1977, p. 231).
Mises anticipated the further notion that inflationary policies are ineffective (point
iii above). This proposition, based upon the unsystematic nature of the public’s
‘mistakes’, will also be inherited by Hayek and by their American descendants: ‘such
a policy of deceit is self-defeating because you can’t fool all the people all the time.
Eventually the masses come to understand the schemes of their rulers. Then the
cleverly concocted plans of inflation collapse’ (Mises, 1952 [1971], p. 419).
3.2 ‘Relative price’ and ‘distributional’ effects
The idea that inflation has distributional effects characterises the Austrian School as
represented in the works of Mises and Hayek, but was not inherited by their American
descendants.2 Mises’s second, more radical attack on monetary policy focuses on
these effects by arguing that the transmission mechanism of monetary policy is based
upon changes in relative prices which are real, not merely ‘perceived’ by economic
agents. This ‘relative price’ effect lies at the root of his model of economic fluctuations,
which should be analysed by taking into account its theoretical foundations first.
Mises, one of the founders of the neoclassical ‘cash balance’ approach to monetary
theory,3 was critical of the mechanical versions of the Quantity Theory, and in par-
ticular of the latter’s proposition that a change in the money supply results in an equi-
proportional change in the price level (Mises, 1924 [1971], pp. 129, 139–45, 206–12).
1 Mises hastened to add (‘in order to guard against any possible misunderstanding’) that relative
prices are also affected in the inflationary process (Mises, 1924 [1971], p. 164). See below, section 3.2.
2 Mises would probably have objected to their practice of assuming them away. This point confirms
the complexity of the relationship between Mises and Hayek, on the one hand, and Friedman and
Lucas, on the other, as the mixed results emerging from the literature show (Kim, 1988; Ruhl, 1995). In
spite of some relevant analytical differences, here Friedman and Lucas are considered as the heirs of the
Austrians, both for their subscribing to the central message illustrated in Section 2, and for the analytical
similarities between their writings illustrated in the text.
3 For Mises’s development of the cash balance approach and the real balance effect see (1924, [1971],
particularly pp. 132–5, 138–40). Patinkin (1965, particularly ch. 8, and p. 167 n. 18), while recognising
Mises as the founder of the cash-balance approach, failed to give him full credit for the ‘real balance effect’.
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He was explicit that the equiproportionality proposition holds true only in
a comparative static sense, but not in the dynamic sense: doubling the quantity of
money in a country will not lead to a doubling of the price level, since the latter view
implies the untenable assumption that the new money is distributed exactly in
proportion to each individual’s existing money holdings,1 which is equivalent to
assuming distributional effects away.
In reality, the new money is always injected into the system at particular points.
Consequently, the relative wealth of individuals is affected, and so are relative prices:
the relative prices of the goods favoured by individuals whose real wealth has increased
rise more than those of the goods favoured by individuals whose relative wealth has
fallen. Through its effects on the incomes of the sellers of the different categories of
goods, this process leads to a change in income distribution (Mises, 1924 [1971], pp.
207, 139–140; Mises, 1938 [1990]). Thus, the effects of money on relative prices and
its distributional effects are parts of the same process.
Mises went further and, in analysing the effects of changes in the quantity of money
on relative prices and income distribution, developed a distinction between the case
when the only money in circulation is money ‘in the narrower sense’, or ‘money
proper’, and the case when, in addition to this, ‘fiduciary money’ is also accepted as
a means of exchange (Mises, 1924 [1971], p. 134). By ‘money proper’ he meant
commodity money, fiat money, and what he defined as credit money, i.e., that money
which arises out of loans from existing purchasing power. By fiduciary money, he
meant all money certificates that are not covered by the reservation of corresponding
sums of money proper, and are accepted merely on account of the trustworthiness of
their issuing bodies (ibid., p. 133, also pp. 261–77).
Let us start with the first case, when only ‘money proper’ exists. If all ‘money
proper’ were metallic money, its quantity would be exogenous to national policies, and
merely depend on the world production of the precious metals (ibid., pp. 208–9, 219).
However, in modern times, most of the circulation of ‘money proper’ is fiat money,
whose supply is under the direct control of the monetary authorities. Theirs is the
responsibility for the ‘social consequences’ of money expansions, which include:
(i) a redistribution in favour of the issuing authorities themselves, if they use the
new money for direct purchases (the inflation tax: in this case ‘the State
[exploits] its power to create new money as a source of income’ and its ideology
in so doing is ‘merely a disguised absolutism’); or a redistribution in favour of
those into whose hands the new money accrues first (such as, during wartime
periods, war contractors) (ibid., pp. 202, 210);
(ii) a redistribution in favour of all those whose money incomes rise as inflation, such as
entrepreneurs, and against all those whose money incomes lag behind prices, such
as wage earners and public officials (to the extent that they do not organise on
trade-unions lines) (ibid., p. 211): this redistribution being the basis of ‘forced
saving’;2
1 See his criticism of Hume, Mill and Fisher (Mises, 1924 [1971], pp. 140–5). See Patinkin (1965,
p. 575); Garrison (1986).
2 The distributional effects of inflation in favour of profits were anticipated by Wicksell in his Interest
and Prices, and by more ancient economists, such as Malthus (Malthus, 1811 [1963]; Costabile, 1983).
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(iii) a redistribution from creditors to debtors, as the money interest rate does not
necessarily adjust to cover the depreciation of loans. Eventually, this discourages
saving and capital accumulation, and may lead to ‘capital consumption through
falsification of economic calculation’. ‘The appearance of the boom that it
creates is an illusion’ (1952 [1971], pp. 195–201, 221).
These bad ‘social consequences’ are greatly exacerbated in the second case con-
sidered, i.e., when there is also fiduciary money, which is accepted merely because
its issuers (the state and the banks) are regarded as trustworthy. Being created out of
nothing, fiduciary money does not need to be backed by any reserve of money proper,
and has no fixed quantitative relationship with it.
Additional evils derive from this circumstance. As we shall see presently, the process
of capital accumulation is interfered with, thus generating economic fluctuations.
4. Austrian cycles
Mises derived his articulated model of economic fluctuations from a combination of
Bo¨hm-Bawerk’s theory of capital and Wicksell’s analysis of the banking sector’s
interest policy.
One way to illustrate the Austrian theory of capital (which Mises borrowed from
Bo¨hm-Bawerk, although with some reserves: see Mises 1924 [1971], p. 339, fn 1) is to
consider all capital as circulating capital, employed in production processes of
different lengths (Blaug, 1968, p. 503). Assuming a given labour force, a lengthening
of the period of production requires more working capital per person, for two reasons:
because, the longer the production process, the more intermediate goods workers
require to work with, and, secondly, because workers have to be supported for the
whole length of this longer process.
A lengthening of the period of production (the adoption of more ‘roundabout’
methods) leads to increased production, but the marginal return to ‘lengthening’ is
decreasing (Mises, 1924 [1971], p. 361). Such a lengthening will only be undertaken
by entrepreneurs if the marginal return on one additional unit of capital is just greater
than the interest they pay to capitalists, from whom they borrow, either directly or
through the intermediation of the banking sector. Thus the length of the period of
production is determined, in equilibrium, by the condition that the rate of interest must
be equal to the marginal return of investment,1 and this length must be such that ‘the
whole available subsistence fund is necessary on the one hand, and sufficient on the
other, for paying the wages of the labourers throughout the duration of the productive
process2 (ibid., p. 360). However, equilibrium may be disrupted by the banking policy.
It was in this connection that Mises adopted Wicksell’s distinction between
the natural (or ‘equilibrium’) rate, and the money interest rate (ibid., pp. 359–64).
1 ‘The level of the natural rate of interest is limited by the productivity of that lengthening of the
period of production which is just justifiable economically and of that of the period of production which
is just not justifiable; for the interest on the unit of capital upon whose aid the lengthening depends must
always amount to less than the marginal return of the justifiable lengthening and to more than the
marginal return of the unjustifiable lengthening’ (Mises, 1924 [1971], p. 360).
2 ‘For if it were shorter, all the workers could not longer be provided for throughout its whole course,
and the consequence would be an urgent offer of the unemployed economic factors which could not fail
to bring about a transformation of the existing arrangement’ (ibid.). This is a rather indirect way of
stating the assumption of full employment.
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The natural rate is the rate that would emerge if the borrowing were made without
the intermediation of money (ibid., p. 118), or if the banking sector acted as a pure
intermediary between borrowers and lenders. Under these conditions, any lengthen-
ing of the production period could only take place if the additional resources had been
made available either by capitalists’ increased savings, or by the producers themselves,
via a voluntary reduction in their standard of living.1 In either case, saving is the
necessary condition of capital accumulation, which takes the form of a lengthening of
the production period.
All this changes when the banks stop behaving as pure intermediaries. Mises had the
following points to make regarding their money supply.
First, he distinguished between the two roles performed by banks. One is that of
a middleman between borrowers and lenders, as reflected in ‘the English definition of
a banker as a man who lends other people’s money’ (ibid., p. 270). The other, far more
important role, is that pertaining to banks entitled to the right of note issue, and of
carrying on current account business. While, in the former role, banks simply transfer
from the lender to the borrower a purchasing powerwhich already exists, in their second
role they create new purchasing power, by making loans ‘out of a fund that did not exist
before the loans were granted ’ (ibid., p. 271, emphasis in the original).
Secondly, there are no limits to the expansion of fiduciary media by the banking
sector, in excess of ‘money in the narrower sense’ or ‘money proper’, provided the
single constituent banks adopt a uniform interest rate policy.2 (The single bank could
not adopt a policy different from those of the other banks, because it would soon run
out of reserves.)
By reducing the interest rate below the natural rate, the banks induce an extension
in the money demand which has no limits but the banks’ own willingness to lend. (If
they wanted to, the banks could reduce the money interest rate to a level just sufficient
to cover the technical costs of producing bank money, which are very low.) This
happens because the demand for money is basically the entrepreneurs’ demand for
investment purposes, i.e., what Keynes would later call the demand for ‘finance’ (ibid.,
p. 316), which is stimulated by the divergence between the two rates. Thus, the supply
of money responds elastically to the demand for it, and the latter is influenced by the
banks’ own interest policy (ibid., p. 310).3
The consequence, an artificial lengthening in the structure of production, ‘is in the
last resort inadmissible and impracticable’, since it has no justification in the
underlying real data, since no new saving has occurred. The basic point which Mises
is trying to make is that an increase in saving, had it occurred, would have reduced the
natural rate, and this reduction would have signalled the greater willingness of savers
to abstain from current consumption. In essence, the disequilibrium process amounts
1 ‘A lengthening of the period of production is only practicable . . . when either the means for the
subsistence have increased sufficiently to support the labourers and entrepreneurs during the longer
period or when the wants of producers have decreased sufficiently to enable them to make the same
means of subsistence do for the longer period’ (Mises, 1924 [1971], p. 361). From the context, I
interpret Mises as arguing here that the increase in the means of subsistence, referred to in the first part
of his sentence, derives from capitalists’ abstention from consumption.
2 This point, and its derivation from Wicksell’s ‘pure credit’ economy, have been emphasised by
Bellofiore (1998) and Laidler (1994, p. 6).
3 On these grounds, Mises rejected the Banking School’s opinion that the banks cannot create an
amount of money exceeding the needs of commerce, i.e., the ‘real bills doctrine’ (Mises, 1924 [1971],
pp. 342–5). See also Mises (1944 [1995], pp. 69–71).
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to the banks’ artificially distorting relative price ‘signals’, since there is no real saving to
‘back’ the longer production processes induced by their policy.
Goods and labour are thus subtracted from the ‘lower’ production stages, and
devoted to the production of a greater quantity of intermediate products. Conse-
quently, just when more consumption goods are required to support workers during
the longer production processes, their production is curtailed: ‘A time must
necessarily come when the means of subsistence available for consumption are all
used up although the capital goods employed in production have not been trans-
formed into consumption goods’. This situation is ‘expressed in a reduction of the
quantity of goods available for consumption and a consequent restriction of
consumption’ (ibid., p. 362). The counterpart to this shrinkage of workers’ consump-
tion (i.e., forced saving) is a shortage of voluntary saving, which makes the completion
of these ‘unwarranted’ longer processes impossible.
A ‘crisis’ is unavoidable, because the relative scarcity of consumption goods induces
a new change in relative prices, thus reducing the profitability of more roundabout
techniques. Moreover, even if the banks tried to extend further their credit circulation,
to the purpose of keeping the money rate below the natural rate, they could not pursue
their expansionary monetary policy indefinitely, because ‘such an avalanche of
fiduciary media’ (ibid., p. 363) would lead to a fall in the value of money and,
consequently, to panic. As a consequence, the money interest rate will start to rise.
The general result is a net loss of resources for the community as a whole: because
the malajustment is not entirely reversible, some of the new plants must be left
‘entirely unused, or at least used less economically’ (ibid., p. 364).
Let us draw the moral of this story: the banking policy disrupts the price mechanism,
which serves as the vehicle for consumers to express their sovereignty through the
market process; the market retaliates by re-establishing the true price signals, but only at
the cost of destroying the value of economic resources:1 a monetary interference is, at
one and the same time, ineffective and disruptive of the economic order.2
Thus we may conclude this section by saying that Mises reached the same
conclusion as his American descendants, only through a more ‘roundabout’ analytical
route.
5. Capital accumulation: Mises’s second view
As we have seen, the basic message of Mises’s approach to business cycles was that
consumers’ sovereignty can be interfered with only at the cost of a net loss for the
community as a whole. Moreover, this interference is bound to be ineffective.
Although certainly the best suited to the ‘Austrian’ liberal perspective, Mises’s
conclusion is not granted, since its analytical underpinnings are not watertight. First, it
is not clear why the limit on the expansion of banks’ loans should become effective
before the more roundabout production processes are completed, and their fruits, in
the form of increased total production, made available to the population. If the low
1 ‘The discrepancy between what the entrepreneurs do [as a consequence of the banks‘ credit policy],
and what the unhampered market would have prescribed becomes evident in a crisis’ (1944 [1995],
p. 87).
2 This ‘propagation mechanism’, overinvestment in capital induced by inflationary policies is
a distinctively Austrian mechanism, which, somewhat modified, Lucas (1977, p. 237 fn 15) borrows
from his European predecessors.
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interest policy continued until this new production were available for consumption,
then the increased demand for consumption goods could be satisfied at constant
prices, and the ‘disentanglement’ of resources from the more roundabout processes
would become unnecessary. This criticism is particularly appropriate because the
untimely rise in interest rates charged by the banking sector, with its catastrophic
consequences, was defined by Mises as unavoidable, but no good reason was provided
for this unfortunate timing (ibid., pp. 363–5).
Secondly, Mises’s argument is based on the notion that capital formation must be
curtailed when consumption rises, but this is certainly not the case if there are unused
resources. Under these circumstances, saving would not be a constraint on capital
formation, since increased investment would generate increased incomes, out of which
both saving and consumption could be raised.
Thirdly, even assuming full employment, Mises’s assumption that the only ‘main-
tainable’ volume of investment is that determined by the existing volume of voluntary
saving, is not convincing. In alternative models, the maintainable rate of investment is,
rather, determined by the new profit opportunities opened up by population growth
and technical progress. In this context, it may well happen that the available amount of
saving is insufficient to finance the volume of investments that would allow these new
profit opportunities to be fully exploited. Under these circumstances, the extension of
the money supply is a most effective means for promoting economic growth via
a redistribution in favour of the ‘rich’ classes of society, and of business profits. Under
reasonable assumptions concerning the difference in the saving propensities of the
different classes, a higher average propensity to save will thus be established. This
process, as is well known, is at the heart of the post-Keynesian models of economic
growth and, as we will see, of the broader ‘Dynamic’ approach.
Of the three criticisms just considered the third one is the most fundamental,
because the process it describes is valid under Mises’s own assumptions. Paradoxical
as it may seem, Mises was perfectly aware of this process and of its consequences, but
deliberately refused to make it central to his argument.
At several points in his argument, Mises anticipated the post-Keynesian, rather than
the ‘Austrian’ story, by recognising explicitly that a monetary expansion can indeed
lead to a permanent increase in the capital stock via its distributional effects, and its
consequent augmenting effects on total saving. But, every time he indicated the
possibility of this permanent effect, he withdrew, announcing that he did not propose
to pursue this line of argument any further.
Thus, in addressing the debated question whether an increase in the quantity of
money could result in a rise in the community’s wealth and welfare, he answered that
such an increase could lead directly only to a change in the distribution of economic
goods, not to an increase in their quantity, but recognised that the indirect effect might
well be an increase in the total amount of goods. This would occur ‘in the same way in
which any change in distribution may affect production as well; that is, by those classes
in whose favour the redistribution occurs using their additional command of money to
accumulate more capital than would have been accumulated by those people from
whom money was withdrawn’. His abrupt escape from this admission took the
following form: ‘[b]ut this does not concern us here’ (ibid., p. 208); a sentence to be
echoed in similar statements whenever, in his analysis, he bumped into the permanent
effects of monetary expansions on capital accumulation.
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In several passages, he was explicit that a change in the money supply could bring
about a change in the average propensity to save, and, consequently, an increase in the
maintainable rate of accumulation (ibid., pp. 347–8).
In one extremely interesting passage, he argued that the banks themselves, being the
issuers of the fiduciary media, may reap the benefits of an increase in the quantity of
these media. This redistribution of income in their favour ‘is particularly favourable to
the accumulation of capital, for in such a case the issuing body employs the additional
wealth that it receives solely for productive purposes, whether directly by initiating and
carrying through a process of production or indirectly by lending to producers’. This
passage shows beyond any reasonable doubt that Mises was aware that the effects of
a monetary expansion on capital accumulation depend entirely on the use to which the
resources released through the rise in the price level are devoted; and, moreover, that
the effectiveness of this process is totally independent on the ‘sovereignty’ of the
original owners of these resources. Mises’s conclusion was that ‘there is a high degree
of probability that extensive issues of fiduciary media by the banks represent a strong
impulse towards the accumulation of capital and have consequently contributed to the
fall in the rate of interest’ (ibid., pp. 349–50).
Following this train of thought, he reached the embarrassing conclusion that an
increase in capital accumulation stimulated by a monetary expansion could determine
a fall in the natural rate of interest itself, thus contradicting his own view that the
money rate should sooner or later converge towards the natural rate. This passage
occurs in the middle of the central argument illustrating the destructive effects of the
banking policy: ‘[s]o far as these factors [i.e., the rise in the average propensity to save]
enter into consideration, an increase of fiduciary media does cause a diminution of
even the natural rate of interest, as we could show if it were necessary’. But, again, he
hastened to withdraw from such a disturbing result, which would have been sufficient
to overthrow the whole sense and conclusions of his reasoning, with the embarrassed
and astonishing sentence: ‘[b]ut the case that we have to investigate is a different one.
We are not concerned with a reduction in the natural rate of interest brought about by
an increase in the issue of fiduciary media, but with a reduction below this rate in the
money rate charged by the banks’ (ibid., pp. 361–2).
Thus, as we have documented, it was neither analytical incompatibility nor
analytical incompetence that led Mises to be the father of the ‘Austrian’ rather than
the ‘Dynamic’ approach. Why, then, did he systematically skip the discussion of the
alternative process? Since he never declared the reasons for his reluctance, he deprived
us of the ‘ultimate proof’. Consequently, some interpretation of the relevant evidence
is in order.
Our point of departure is his explicit admission of the political and ideological
nature of his objectives. Lamenting the ‘subjection of the value of money to the influ-
ence of political forces’, and defining the principle of sound money as a defence against
political interference, he defined monetary management as an‘anti-democratic’ policy
(ibid., p. 223).
Some light on the nature of this democratic concern is shed by his lucid remark that,
in spite of appearances, what is at issue in conflicts over currency and credit policies is
ultimately the distribution of economic goods (ibid., p. 218). More precisely, he saw
‘inflationism’ as a powerful device to favour debtors at the expence of creditors, and
argued that ‘policies favouring creditors at the expense of debtors have never been
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popular. Lenders of money have been held in odium, at all times and among all people’
(ibid., p. 232). The defence of lenders’ interests, a major theme in his book, explicitly
underlies his definition of the ‘monetary ideal’, as consisting in a ‘money with an
invariable exchange value’, or at least, in a metallic money whose value would be
‘independent of deliberate human intervention’ (ibid., p. 237; but see ch. VII).
But the strength of this argument would have been severely limited by the logical
implications of his ‘second view’. Given his ideological commitment, there was no
choice between the horns of this theoretical dilemma, as the apparent conflict between
his political argument and the implications of his ‘second view’ had to be solved in
favour of the former. This is why, faced with the consequences of his insights, he
stopped his argument abruptly, as if horrified by the vision which his own analysis had
disclosed to him: i.e., that political interference with ‘civil liberties’, ‘consumers’
sovereignties’ and lenders’ interests may promote growth, thus being beneficial to the
community as a whole.
In which direction could Mises’s ‘second view’ have been developed, had Mises
himself not refrained from exploring its consequences? As we shall see, the disequi-
librium process imposed on the ‘general public’ leads to entirely different results in the
Dynamists’ approach.
6. Robertson the ‘Dynamist’: the vision
When investments exceed voluntary savings, growth may occur ‘out of equilibrium’ in
Robertson’s model, as developed in the 1920s (mainly in Banking Policy and the Price
Level and related writings).1 The ‘ideological vision’ underlying his approach is a good
starting point for our analysis.
‘Dynamists’ regard fluctuations as a physiological feature of the process of growth,
given the institutional characteristics of capitalism. Cycles are not due to external
interference: as soon as we abandon a purely static concept of the market, and consider
its dynamic workings, cyclical fluctuations will appear as an essential part of the
market mechanism itself and, more precisely, of the process of economic growth in
a market economy based on capital accumulation. Thus, cycles are not a pathology
inflicted upon the private sector. Rather, they are, at least partly, an ‘appropriate’
phenomenon: the symptom of the economic system’s good health, of its enduring
propulsive force, of its ability to develop.
Capitalist economies are dynamic economies: their very essence is a continuous
push towards change and progress. And ‘the explosive forces of industrial progress’
inevitably generate ‘industrial instability’, that is, the trade cycle (Robertson, 1926).
Or, as another ‘Dynamist’, Schumpeter, put it, cyclical fluctuations are ‘the form that
progress takes in a capitalist society’ (Schumpeter, 1927 [1989], p. 30).
The link between growth and cycles is deeply embedded in the institutional settings
of capitalist societies (or, as Robertson put it, in their ‘technical and legal structure’),
which is based upon the fundamental conflict between ‘Capital’ and ‘Labour’
1 Money (1922, 1928A); ‘Theories of the banking policy’ (1928B); ‘Saving and hoarding’ (1933). See
also ‘Thoughts on meeting some important persons’ (1954 [1956]) and the third volume of his Lectures
on Economic Principles (1956–59). I will not deal with the vexed question of explaining Robertson’s
undisputed ‘evolution’, or ‘involution’, towards orthodoxy, from the 1930s onwards. See Danes (1979),
Anadyke-Danes (1985) and Fletcher (2000). On Robertson in the 1920s, see Laidler (1995).
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(Robertson, 1926, pp. 26–7)1. Central importance, among other institutional features
of capitalist economies, was also attributed to the banking system in its function as
creator of purchasing power.
The process of growth in this economy is not the automatic product of either the
growth of exogenous factors, or of the accumulation of savings. These factors may
explain growth in equilibrium, or steady growth. But, as Robertson argued, some of
the most important episodes of growth have occurred by inflicting a disequilibrium
process on the ‘general public’ of consumers–savers, particularly on wage earners
(Robertson, 1965, p. 360).2 In the process of growth out of equilibrium, the pace of
economic dynamics is set by investments, which are discontinuous in their character:
this is why, as we shall see in closer detail, growth is a cyclical process.
The ‘pre-analytical’ view of capitalist economies underlying this class of models is
also ‘liberal’, but of a different variety than that implied by the ‘Austrian’ approach.
First, the private sector is not supposed to be ‘stable’ in itself, and subject to the
destabilising influence of the public sector, as in the Austrian model. Inflation (in
upturns) and deflation (in downturns) are not prices paid to an external authority,
supposed to behave like a predator in its policy intervention; rather, they are a price
that the private sector pays to itself—the price for economic progress and growth,
a price that is well worthwhile paying.
Secondly, these authors’ liberalism is generally characterised by a progressive attitude
towards the interests of the social classes hurt by capitalist instability: mostly, the wage
earners. This certainly was a major concern for Robertson in the 1920s. In the address
delivered to the Liberal Summer School in 1923, he proposed a detailed programme of
stabilisation and insurance against the unemployment generated by ‘that particular
system of rights and laws under which we live, and which is variously described as
Private Enterprise, Capitalism, Economic Freedom and Wage Slavery’. The causes of
instability that he was trying to remedy found their roots in ‘the real cleavages of interest
between individuals and groups, which can only be composed with the assistance of the
strong hand of the State’. This stabilisation programme, he argued, was ‘the most
important constructive domestic task to which Liberalism can set its hands’ because, in
the presence of mass unemployment, ‘it is idle to expect that the manual worker will
continue to bear the ills he has rather than to fly to others which he knows not of: nor, in
my judgement, will there be much moral justification for urging him to do so’
(Robertson, 1923 [1931], p. 143–4). In the light of these remarks, and of his ‘gentle
renunciation of Hayekian deflationism’, there is no wonder that, as Samuelson (1963)
aptly remarked, Robertson was never ‘the darling of the libertarians’ .
Thirdly, individual saving decisions are not generally a binding constraint on
growth, given that the production of capital goods is not normally financed by savings,
but by bank credit. While in the 1930s Robertson reverted to more orthodox views
concerning the saving–investment relationship, in the 1920s, as many interpreters
have recognised, he saw savings and investments as independent variables (Danes,
1 Alternative types of economy are characterised by alternative technologies of exchange (barter and
monetary economies) and ownership regimes (cooperative economies and capitalist economies, which
were labelled ‘our wage and money system’ (Robertson, 1949, chs 1 and 2, particularly pp. 7–8, 19–23;
Anadyke-Danes, 1985; Costabile, 1985, 1993).
2 More radically, Schumpeter maintained that growth in capitalist economies is always a disequilib-
rium process (Schumpeter, 1927 [1989], p. 25).
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1979; Anadyke-Danes, 1985; Fellner, 1952; Robinson, 1946), and considered that
saving decisions are simply frustrated, as long as they differ from the predetermined
amount of investment. This happens because the interest rate is not the equilibrating
force between these variables (Bigg, 1990, p. 92), the equilibrating role being rather
performed by changes in the price level and income distribution.1 These features
explain why, looking back at the model he had developed in the 1920s, Robertson
(1954) regarded it as a precursor of the ‘Domar’s equation’, as well as of Harrod’s
Autonomous Investment; and why such authors as, among others, Hicks (1964) and
Fellner (1952) also considered Robertson as a precursor of the post-Keynesian
approach to growth.
7. Growth in equilibrium
Robertson’s basic objective in chapters 5–7 of his Banking Policy and the Price Levelwas
to illustrate the relationships between saving, credit creation and capital accumulation
(see the Preface to the 1949 edition of Banking Policy and the Price Level). This objective
clarifies the nature of his model, which was essentially a growth model,2 focusing on:
first, the conditions for growth in equilibrium, or steady growth; secondly, the
relationships between real and monetary factors as determinants of growth (not
merely as causes of economic fluctuations); and, thirdly, the possibility and, under
certain circumstances, the desirability of growth ‘out of equilibrium’. It is only in the
context of growth that the issue of cycles becomes relevant to Robertson’s analysis.
The model’s assumptions are as follows:
(i) all prices are flexible, but some money incomes, including wages, are relatively
sticky;
(ii) all capital goods are considered as ‘goods in process’, or ‘unready goods’
(Robertson, 1928A, p. 103): they are defined as circulating capital, and include
wage-goods (Robertson, 1949, p. 42);
(iii) there are no limits to the expansion of the money supply and, contrary to the
assumptions of what Cannan labelled ‘cloakroom’ banking, the banking system
is not a mere intermediary between depositors and borrowers: rather, it produces
the most important forms of money by granting credits to entrepreneurs.
Consequently, three further assumptions are introduced:
(iv) all bank assets consist of loans to firms for the financing of working capital (ibid.,
p. 58, fn1);
(v) all capital is provided by the banks (ibid.);
(vi) all money takes the form of bank deposits, and all savings are kept in money
balances (ibid., p. 52).
Starting with a ‘stationary economy’ (ibid., ch. V, sections 6 and 9; Appendix, sections
1 and 2), the analysis is later extended to a steadily growing economy (the general case
1 In his later days, Robertson remarked: ‘I think it is possible that my first draft (achieving in this
a post-Keynesian modernity which I should now be the last to defend!) made no mention of the rate of
interest whatever’ (1949, p. xi). Indeed, it was not until 1934 in his Economic Journal article, that
Robertson adopted the Wicksellian interest rate approach, following the work of Keynes and Hayek.
2 Samuelson (1963), Hicks (1964, p. 312, 316), Fellner (1952), Gilbert (1982, pp. 66–70) and Bigg
(1990, p. 92) recognised Robertson as a precursor of the theory of growth. Costabile (1993, 1997)
develops these insights into a more systematic analysis of Robertson’s model.
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of a ‘steady economy’, i.e., one that is either stationary or steadily growing, is also dealt
with in ch. V, section 2).
Growth in equilibrium should be analysed first. Given assumptions (v) and (vi)




where Mt is the money stock in the current period, Ct is circulating capital and Pt is the
price level.
The second equation is the famous ‘Cambridge equation’, in which, given the
model’s assumption, agents’ saving behaviour is encapsulated. This equation specifies




where k is the fraction of their real incomes which households wish to save and keep in
liquid form, and Rt is the community’s real income in the period considered. In other
words, kRt is the real value of bank deposits.




where Ct/Rt is the (circulating) capital:output ratio. This ratio can be considered as
a technical constant, or, as Robertson argued, as a ‘quasi-constant’. Let us define v as
being equal to Ct/Rt. Thus we can rewrite the above equality as:
k¼ v ð3#Þ
This equation states the equilibrium condition that households save and (given the
model’s assumptions) keep in liquid assets a fraction k of their real income exactly
equal to the fraction v, which is used as circulating capital in production and hence is
not available for consumption.
It should be stressed that this is a genuine equilibrium condition, not an identity.
For k and v are determined by entirely independent forces (ibid., p.57): k reflects
households’ choices concerning their saving and hoarding behaviour, while v is
a technical quasi-constant. Therefore, even in a stationary society, they would be equal
by a mere fluke. As Robertson said: ‘the preservation of even a stationary equilibrium
would be something of a miracle’ (1954, p. 77).1
Robertson’s analysis here points towards the same problem that Domar (1946,
1947) was to raise at a later stage, namely the sustainability of the ‘warranted’ rate of
growth, as can be seen more clearly by developing Robertson’s equations with
reference to a growing economy. Consider, first, that the real stock of money in any
given year is equal to the money stock inherited from the past, plus that deriving from
1 Samuelson (1963), in his interesting reconstruction of Robertson‘s model, grudgingly acknow-
ledged that Robertson was dealing here with ex ante variables. His comment was: ‘[a]ll this is very non-
neoclassical, very non-Robertsonish’. For non-neoclassical as Robertson’s model might have been, it is
difficult to see how it could have been non-Robertsonish, since it was Robertson’s own model; and, in
my view, this point is essential to his views on money and growth.
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current savings (St), which, as already stated, in this model are entirely kept as money








where p ¼ (Pt – Pt1)/Pt.

















Let us define g as the rate of growth of real output. HenceRt¼Rt1(1þ g). Dynamic
equilibrium, in this model, requires price stability, as lack of both inflationary or
deflationary pressures is a consequence of the coherence between households’
intertemporal choices and firms’ investment decisions. g* is the rate of growth which




This equation defines the equilibrium rate of growth as equal to the ratio between the
propensity to save and the fraction of real incomes which people hold as money
balances. Using the equilibrium condition (3#) (which states the equality between k




which is identical to the celebrated ‘Domar equation’, and states that the rate of
growth must be equal to the ratio between the propensity to save and the capital:
output ratio.
An alternative formulation of this equilibrium condition is:
kþ s¼ vð1þ g*Þ ð10Þ
showing that dynamic equilibrium is preserved if the stock of capital held by the firms
sector (on the right-hand side) grows exactly at the same rate which guarantees the
absorption of the fraction of real incomes not consumed by the community (on the
left-hand side).
Focusing on the links between the real and monetary forces, this model can be
compared to Domar’s. Robertsonian equilibrium requires that the real stock of money
held by the saving public (not merely the portion of this stock deriving from the flow of
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their current savings) be equal to the real value of the stock of circulating capital held
by the firms sector. The Robertsonian formulation, by focusing on the equilibrium
between the household sector’s decisions as to their stock of liquid assets, and the
firms’ decisions concerning capital formation, sheds some interesting light on the
interactions between real and monetary equilibrium conditions, which were not
clarified by Domar and other post-Keynesians. Moreover, contrary to Domar’s model,
Robertson’s is characterised by price flexibility, implying that equilibrium means lack
of pressures on prices, as a consequence of the coherence between the ‘general
public’s’ intertemporal choices and firms’ investment decisions.
There is a second important difference: Robertson’s analysis of equilibrium growth
mainly concerns the growth of circulating capital since, as a first approximation,
Robertson considered investments mainly as the process of producing new capital
goods, and was interested in the financing of production, as opposed to the financing of
the purchase of capital.1 He later acknowledged this basic difference between his ‘basic
model’ and Domar’s (Robertson, 1954 [1956], pp. 78–9). Although relevant, this
difference does not invalidate the conclusion that Robertson anticipated the post-
Keynesian analysis of ‘steady growth’ and the post-Keynesian awareness that the
preservation of dynamic equilibrium, in the form of an equality between the actual and
the ‘warranted’ rates of growth, would be problematical and purely casual.
Robertson also anticipated some aspects of the Harrodian approach to the ‘natural
rate of growth’ (Harrod, 1939, 1948). He analysed separately the two exogenous
factors: population growth (1949, ch. V, section 8, and Appendix, sections 4 and 5) and
technical progress (ibid., ch. 5, section 7, and Appendix, section 3), showing that the
conditions for steady growth in an economy growing at an exogenous rate of (1 þ r)
(dictated by either or both these exogenous factors) imply equality between the real
value of the money stock and the capital:ouput ratio multiplied by (1 þ r). ‘In
Harrodese’, he argued (Robertson, 1954 [1956], p. 77), this is the condition that would
‘enable the warranted rate of growth to be maintained and to correspond with the
natural rate’.2
8. Growth out of equilibrium
In spite of the lack of ex-ante coordination between households’ intertemporal
consumption plans and firms’ investment decisions, capitalist economies grow.
According to Robertson, entrepreneurs’ investment decisions are motivated by their
will to exploit new, profitable outlets opened up by technical progress, population
growth, the opening of new markets, and so on.
When the amount of savings spontaneously generated by the market is less than
entrepreneurs’ demand, and entrepreneurs themselves are not able or willing to
provide the required difference, investments projects will be realised if the banking
sector is willing to supply finance. Thus, growth out of equilibrium requires that
monetary forces are activated.
1 All capital goods (circulating capital and fixed capital) are alike from the point of view of the kind of
saving which their production requires: that is, ‘short saving’. By contrast, the purchase of capital goods
‘involves a further provision of saving, this time of the long variety’ (Robertson, 1949, p. 85). He dealt
with fixed capital in chapter 7.
2 See Besomi (1998) on the relationship between Robertson and Harrod, as it emerges also from their
correspondence.
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Suppose we are in a disequilibrium situation where v  k 6¼ 0, this difference being
an ‘error signal’ (Samuelson, 1963). For simplicity, think of an economy whose
population’s rate of growth rises from zero to a positive value r. Stimulated by this rise
(possibly because they interpret it as a promise of an expanding market) firms decide
to give employment to the new population. Given the unchanging saving habits of the
old population, they must demand loans to the banking sector for the payment of
wages to the new population, at the current wage rate, w.
Investment (that is, the absorption of the new population into employment) is
impossible if banks do not respond elastically to firms’ demand. This would not be
true, of course, if the saving and hoarding decisions of the old population were to
change at the firms’ will. If we rule out such an extreme possibility, as well as the
equivalent one that the rate of interest acts as a perfect equilibrating factor, then
investment projects will be converted into actual investments only if the supply of
money rises at a rate equal to the population’s growth rate. In other words, money has
to behave as an endogenous variable.
Assume that this elastic response occurs. If, as Robertson hypothesised, the new
population produces its output with a lag, and if the new population’s saving and
hoarding habits are the same as those of the old population, the demand for capital
goods (i.e., the wage goods for the maintenance of new workers) rises at the same rate
as the population and the money supply, that is at a rate r. To see the disequilibrium
consequences involved in this process, let us go back to our equation (3), which we
now rewrite as:
kPtRt ¼PtCt ð3$Þ
The right-hand side of this equation has now risen by a factor (1 þ r) owing to the rise
in population and investment, whereas the left-hand side has not changed. In other




is less than zero. Who is going to provide the required amount of savings? How is
equilibrium going to be re-established?
The answer to the first question is that people on fixed incomes experience
a disequilibrium situation, since their consumption falls below the planned level,







where Awt is the consumption of wage earners (for brevity I shall omit mention of other
fixed-income receivers and their earnings), awt is their average propensity to consume,
Wt1 is the wage bill in the previous period, awtWt1 are their money expenditures in
the current period, and Pt
e is the level of prices which they expected to prevail today on
the basis of their adaptive expectation ðPet ¼ Pt1Þ.
The essence of this process is a redistribution from fixed incomes to profits, as the
latter rise exactly in proportion to the rise in the price level. Actual consumption out of
fixed incomes differs from its planned level by an amount depending on the rate of
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price inflation. What will this rate be? Since circulating capital in this model resolves








Since Lt has increased by a factor (1 þ r), P has to rise at the same rate in order for the
equality between the demand and supply of circulating capital to be re-established.1
The difference between individual planned consumption and their actual con-
sumption is what Robertson called ‘automatic lacking’. Workers’ and fixed incomists’
automatic lacking (or, in plain language, their forced saving) is the source of capital
accumulation, whenever the required amount of saving is not spontaneously made
available by the intertemporal choices of capitalists, rentiers, or by those of workers
themselves. This is the essence of growth out of equilibrium: the equality between the
demand and the ex-post supply of circulating capital is not synonymous with
equilibrium. Quite the contrary: in the inflationary context just described it is
obtained by imposing forced saving on ‘the general public’.
Coming now to the second question (how is the equilibrium going to be re-
established?), if labour productivity is constant, at the end of the production period
output will rise at the same rate as population and prices. If no new injection of money
takes place, prices fall back to their original level, and the real wage rate is restored.
The economy will be in equilibrium again, with higher employment. The sacrifices
imposed on the public have made capital accumulation possible. In this case,
accumulation is of the ‘extensive’ variety.
Similar effects derive from technical progress. If, with a constant population, capitalists
see an opportunity for profits in investments embodying technical progress, they resort to
loans from the banking system. Since the new capital goods will produce an increase in
output only after a lag, in the interval prices will rise and, again, the real resources to be
devoted to the deepening of the accumulation process will be provided through the
‘sacrifices’ imposed on fixed incomists.2 The savings:output ratio adapts, via a change in
the price level, to the investment:output ratio autonomously chosen by entrepreneurs:
a solution which anticipated that proposed by Kaldor in his 1955–56 model.
Eventually, the higher productivity of new capital goods will determine a permanent
increase in the level of output. What happens to the price level depends on monetary
policy. If the money supply is kept constant in the face of increased production, prices
will fall. Both Schumpeter and Robertson recognised this ‘autodeflation’ effect of
investments financed by a credit expansion.3 Robertson applied it to an analysis of the
distribution of the fruits of technical progress. Falling prices allow real wages to rise
1 Prices may for a while rise less than in proportion to the increase in the money supply, if
entrepreneurs perform ‘Induced Lacking’ in order to restore the real value of their money balances
(Costabile, 1985; Laidler, 1995).
2 For Schumpeter, sacrifices are also made by the entrepreneurs excluded from the credit injection.
3 The Austrian Schumpeter (anticipating Domar, 1947, p. 50) used this ‘autodeflation’ effect to
criticize the ‘Austrian’ view that expansions have to be stopped for their inflationary consequences
(1927 [1989]), p. 44).
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again, and the fruits of technical progress to be distributed ‘even-handedly’ among the
different classes (Samuelson, 1963, p. 532). By contrast, if the money supply grows at
the same rate as labour productivity, prices do not fall and profits reap all the benefits of
the increased productivity. Robertson recommended that the first policy be adopted, by
arguing that the ‘right’ policy is one that stabilises the ‘price of productive capacity’
(Robertson, 1965, p. 356) rather than the price level. The ‘more scientific’ view, he
argued in 1962 (making an interesting use of this expression), called for falling prices.
Thus, even though disequilibrium initially imposes forced savings on consumers, it
may eventually result in either growing employment at stable standards of living, or in
rising living standards, depending on the extensive or intensive nature of capital
accumulation. Monetary policy is a necessary ingredient at every stage in the process
of disequilibrium growth.
9. Conclusions
What is at stake in the debate on the role of money in economic dynamics is the basic
nature of growth. According to Mises’s ‘Austrian’ approach, the unfettered market
mechanism guarantees consumers’ sovereignty, also in its intertemporal dimension.
Consequently, money should be neutral with respect to the intertemporal equilibrium
generated by the real forces of ‘productivity’ and ‘thrift’. Any arbitrary interference by
the monetary authorities and the banking system may only result in price-signal
distortions and capital disruptions: economic fluctuations are the product of this
disruptive interference.
‘Dynamists’, on the contrary, consider that consumers’ preferences are subordin-
ated to investment decisions, and that money is a fundamental ingredient in the
transition between different equilibrium states in a growing economy. This transition
is often a disequilibrium process. Moreover, growth takes the form of cyclical
expansions and depressions, since investments do not follow a uniform path. This is
why some fluctuations are ‘appropriate’, and any attempt at eliminating them would
be equivalent to an attempt at eliminating growth itself, for the alternation of
expansions and depressions is due to the nature of investment. However, these
oscillations do involve a cost in human welfare, which should be mitigated by policy
intervention.
Monetary and banking policies have a positive role to perform, just because of their
non-neutral effects. More specifically, monetary policy should not blindly promote
price stability because, by curbing cycles, it may hamper economic growth. Rather, it
should be moderately accommodating in the expansionary phase, in order to promote
the redistribution of income required for investment decisions to be realised. It should
subsequently allow prices to fall, in order to distribute the fruits of expansion, in the
form of increased output, among capitalists and workers. Thus, in this alternative
approach, monetary policy is an essential ingredient in secular growth.
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